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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20030771-CA 
vs. 
: Case No. 20030813-CA 
CHRISTOPHER S. KASSUHN 
and, : 
LISA MARIE MANZANARES 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for Christopher S. Kassuhn for Theft, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973), and 
Lisa Marie Manzanares for Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973) and Unlawful Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1981), in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, The Honorable Judith S. Atherton 
Presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-
3(2)(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, and PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when he is 
dispatched late at night to investigate a citizen's report of a suspicious vehicle and where 
he finds the vehicle with three occupants hiding on the floor of the vehicle in an attempt to 
avoid detection. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved on the record. Manzanares Record 
(M.R.): 48 
Standard of Review. '"In examining a denial of a motion to suppress, we review 
the trial court's findings of fact 'under a clearly erroneous standard' and the trial court's 
'ultimate legal conclusions' based on those findings 'under a correctness standard." State 
v. Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, U 5 (quoting State v. Supleveda, 842 P.2d 913, 914 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999)). '"Whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness . . . [with] a measure 
of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of facts.'" State 
v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, | 7, 47 P.3d 932, 935 (alterations in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose interpretation is 
relevant to this appeal are attached at addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15(1980) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 12,2002, Christopher S. Kassuhn was charged with Theft, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973), and Lisa Marie 
Manzanares was charged with Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973) and Unlawful Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in Violation Of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1981). Kassuhn Record 
(K.R.): 2, M.R. 2. On August 2, 2003, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg denied the 
defendants Motion To Suppress Evidence. M. R. 16, K.R. 16. Subsequently, on August 
14, 2003, before Honorable Judith Atherton, Lisa Marie Manzanares and Christopher S. 
Kassuhn entered a Sery plea preserving their right to appeal. M.R. 2, K.R. 1; See 
Addendum B. The defendants timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On May 18, 2002, just after midnight, Deputy Robert Burton was on patrol in the 
Cottonwood Heights area when he was dispatched to 8600 Danish Road to investigate 
a suspicious vehicle. M.R. 48:1-2. The complainant, a neighbor living on Danish Road, 
observed three occupants get out of a vehicle that she didn't recognize as belonging in 
the area. M.R. 48:2, 10. The complainant stated that she saw the occupants walk 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fl 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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westbound across Danish Road into the neighborhood on the west side. M.R. 48: 2. 
When Officer Burton arrived to the area, he located the vehicle. M.R. 48:2:11. The 
vehicle was unoccupied at that time and there was no one near it. M.R. 48:2:12-13. 
The vehicle was registered to Tiffany Hadden at an address on the northwest part of 
Salt Lake County. M.R. 48:2. After identifying the vehicle, Officer Burton proceeded 
to look for the occupants. M.R. 48:2. 
After checking around the neighborhood and not finding anyone, Officer Burton 
returned to the vehicle. M.R. 48:3. It appeared that the vehicle was still unoccupied. 
M.R. 48:3. As Officer Burton was exiting his vehicle, he was notified by dispatch that 
the complainant had called in again, stating that the individuals that had gotten out of 
the vehicle were now inside the vehicle hiding. M.R. 48:3,11. Officer Burton 
approached the vehicle and could see the defendants hiding inside the car. M.R. 48:3. 
He then called for backup to secure his safety since he could not see what the people 
hiding inside the car were doing. M.R. 48:3. Officer Burton then drew his weapon and 
ordered the occupants not to move inside the vehicle. M.R. 48:3. After Officer Burton 
ordered the defendants not to move, the driver's door flew open. M.R. 48:4. Officer 
Burton suspected the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in criminal activity based 
on: the neighbor's tip of a vehicle not belonging in the neighborhood, the lateness of 
the hour, the fact that the occupants were seen leaving the vehicle and walking down 
the street, the fact that the defendants were hiding in the vehicle in an attempt to avoid 
4 
detection, and the fact that after Officer Burton ordered the defendants not to move the 
driver's side door flew open. M.R. 48:4. In Officer Burton's training and experience 
this type of behavior indicated that the possibility of criminal activity and that his life 
could be in danger. M.R. 48:4. 
After backup arrived, the occupants were ordered to exit the car one at a time. M.R. 
48:4. The officers completed a Terry Frisk on each of the occupants and placed them in 
handcuffs for safety. M.R. 48:5. Officer Burton then made contact with the driver to 
find out why they were in the area and hiding in the car. M.R. 48:5. The driver, Tiffany 
Hadden, stated that they were in the area looking for a friend's house and weren't quite 
sure where it was. M.R. 48:5. The two other individuals, Lisa Manzanares, and 
Christopher Kassuhn, gave a similar story. M.R. 48:5. Manzanares stated that she was 
just along for the ride. M.R. 48:5. Officer Burton then asked Hadden if he could search 
the vehicle and she complied. M.R. 48:6. 
After receiving consent to search from Hadden, Officer Burton approached the 
vehicle and could see a bundle of what appeared to be mail partially protruding from 
underneath the driver's seat. M.R. 48:6. The driver's door of the vehicle was still open. 
M.R. 48:6. The mail that was stuck in the seat seemed strange to Officer Burton 
because it was just shoved under it in a big unorganized glob. M.R. 48:6. Officer 
Burton concluded that the mail appeared as though someone was just trying to quickly 
shove something under the seat. M.R. 48:6. Officer Burton then bent down to take a 
5 
closer look at the mail that was in disarray. M.R. 48:7. He noticed a piece of mail with 
an address belonging to the neighborhood they were in. M.R. 48:7. Officer Burton was 
still outside the vehicle at this time and had not yet made physical contact with the 
items inside. M.R. 48:7. Officer Burton then pulled the mail out of the seat and noticed 
that there were a couple of different addresses on the mail from the neighborhood they 
were in. M.R. 48:7. Officer Burton found an insert from a wallet on the front passenger 
floor by the seat. M.R. 48:8. Officer Burton checked the identification from the wallet 
and it came back as belonging to a stolen vehicle. M.R. 48:8. The identification in the 
wallet did not belong to any of the occupants of the vehicle. M.R. 48:8-9. 
Officer Burton again made contact with the driver, Tiffany Hadden, to ask about 
the mail. M.R. 48:9. Tiffany Hadden then admitted that she and the other occupants 
had been in the neighborhood stealing mail out of the mailboxes. M.R. 48:9. Tiffany 
Hadden stated that Lisa Manzanares, and Christopher Kassuhn were present while the 
mail was being taken. M.R. 48:9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion to stop Manzanares and Kassuhn 
because, based on his training and experience as an officer, he concluded that criminal 
activity was afoot. Utah State law and federal law defer to the officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious behavior and consider the totality of 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop. The lower court considered the 
6 
following facts: Officer Burton was dispatched, after midnight, to investigate a 
suspicious vehicle where the occupants were seen leaving and walking down the street; 
the citizen that first reported the suspicious circumstances called again and reported 
that the occupants of the vehicle had returned to the vehicle and were hiding; Officer 
Burton confirmed that the occupants of the vehicle were hiding on the floor of the car, 
which he concluded was an attempt to evade detection. M.R.48: 16. Obvious attempts 
to evade an officer support a finding of reasonable suspicion to stop. Thus, the lower 
court properly found that Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
'"In examining a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the lower court's 
findings of fact 'under a clearly erroneous standard' and the trial court's 'ultimate legal 
conclusions' based on those findings 'under a correctness standard.'" State v. 
Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, t 5 (quoting State v. Supleveda, 842 P.2d 913, 914 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999)). '"Whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness . . . [with] a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of 
facts.'" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, f 7, 47 P.3d 932, 935 (alterations in 
original). 
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I. OFFICER BURTON HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE BASED ON HIS TRAINING AND 
EXPERIENCE AS AN OFFICER, HE CONCLUDED THAT 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT 
Manzanares and Kassuhn claim that Officer Burton conducted a level-two stop 
that was not supported by reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Br. Aplt. at 7. Specifically, Appellants argue that the facts facing Officer Burton at the 
time of the stop were consistent with innocent behavior. Br. Aplt. at 17. However, 
Manzanares' and Kassuhn's argument fails because under the totality of the 
circumstances test, all of the facts taken as a whole show that Officer Burton had 
reasonable suspicion to support the stop. 
A. The Lower court Properly Found That Officer Burton Had Reasonable 
Suspicion To Stop The Defendants Because He Corroborated Suspicious 
Behavior That Included Manzanares' And Kassuhn's Attempt To Avoid 
Detection By Hiding. 
To determine whether a seizure is constitutionally reasonable, the court must 
make a dual inquiry: "(1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and 
(2) Was the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place?" State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah Ct App. 1998) (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 
1994))(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). The Utah Legislature has 
codified the authority of a police officer to stop and question a suspect. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15, provides, "A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
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he has reasonable suspicion to believe that he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions." See also Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT 
App 55, Tf 18, 998 P.2d 274, 280 ("A level two stop . . . must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth Amendment."). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that "[w]hen a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise to 
suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but the duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take such 
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law." State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980) (citing State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)). 
To determine whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect, 
courts look to the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop to 
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. Rodriguez-
Lopi, 954 P.2d at 1292 (citing State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)); See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 (holding that a stop is justified when a police 
officer sees unusual conduct leading the officer to reasonably conclude in light of the 
officer's training and experience that criminal activity may be afoot). In considering 
the totality of the circumstances, Utah courts '"judge the officer's conduct in light of 
common sense and ordinary human experience . . . and . . . accord deference to an 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."5 Beach, 2002 
9 
UT App 160, f 8, 47 P.3d 932, 935 (quoting U.S. v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 
(10th Cir. 2001)); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating 
"The trained law enforcement officer is in a different position than the average citizen 
in that he or she 'may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct 
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.. . . The officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience.'"). 
Reasonable suspicion may be based on "'unusual conduct' that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude 'that criminal activity may be afoot.'" Rodriguez-Lopi, 
954 P.2d at 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). In Rodriguez-
Lopi, the officer observed the defendant drive up to a curb to converse with two 
women that the officer recognized as prostitutes. Id. at 1291. The officer turned on his 
overhead lights to stop the vehicle and could see the defendant frantically trying to 
hide something under the seat. Id The defendant argued that the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to support the stop. Id The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
lower court's finding that "a sufficient number of suspicious circumstances, taken in 
their totality, can justify an investigatory stop." Id. (citing Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143). 
Like Rodriguez-Lopi, in this case there was reasonable suspicion to stop because 
Officer Burton observed "unusual conduct," three people hiding in a car attempting to 
avoid detection. 
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The United States Supreme Court has also addressed this issue. In Illinois v. 
Wardlow, the defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling in an area where 
drug trafficking commonly occurred. 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000). Two officers caught 
up to the defendant and conducted a protective search for weapons. Id. The defendant 
argued that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop because 
his actions were ambiguous and "susceptible of an innocent explanation." Id. at 125. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. In regards to the defendant's attempt to evade the 
police, the Court said, "Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act 
of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive 
of such." Id at 124; See also State v. Cushing, 2004 UT App 73, f 20, 88 P.3d 368. 
The Court determined that when an officer sees ambiguous behavior that suggests the 
possibility of criminal behavior, the officer may "detain the individual to resolve the 
ambiguity." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6). The Court also 
stated: 
In reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available 
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we 
cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement 
officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be 
based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. 
Id at 124-25. 
In this case, Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion to stop Manzanares and 
Kassuhn under both Utah State and federal law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15; 
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Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119; Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290. As stated 
above, "When a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise to suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the duty to make observations and investigations to 
determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take such measures as are 
necessary in enforcement of the law." State v. Whittenback 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 
1980) (citing Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127). The lower court considered the following facts 
in determining that Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion to stop Manzanares and 
Kassuhn: 
Just after midnight, Officer Burton was dispatched to investigate a suspicious 
vehicle. M.R. 48:1-2. The citizen's report was based on the observation of a vehicle 
not belonging to the area and the fact that the occupants were seen leaving the 
vehicle and walking down the street. M.R. 48:2. The citizen's own common sense 
suggested that criminal activity may be afoot. Upon arrival Officer Burton found 
the vehicle that was reported by the citizen. M.R. 48:2. The vehicle was 
unoccupied. M.R. 48:2. Officer Burton ran the plates which came back as 
belonging to Tiffany Hadden at an address on the northwest part of Salt lake 
County. M.R. 48:2. Officer Burton then searched the area for the three occupants of 
the vehicle. M.R. 48:3 When Officer Burton found no one in the area, he returned 
to the vehicle. M.R. 48:3. It appeared as though the vehicle was still unoccupied. 
M.R. 48:3. As he was exiting the vehicle, Officer Burton received another call from 
dispatch stating that the same citizen informant had called again and reported that 
the three persons were now back in the vehicle hiding. M.R. 48:3, 11. Officer 
Burton confirmed that the occupants, Manzanares, Kassuhn, and Hadden, were 
hiding in the vehicle. M.R. 48:5. 
The lower court properly considered the totality of circumstances test as required 
under Utah law and federal law. M.R. 48:16; See Rodriguez-Lopu 954 P.2d at 1292 
(citing Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137 at 141) (finding that courts must look to the totality of 
12 
the circumstances present at the time of the stop to determine whether an officer has 
reasonable suspicion to stop); See also U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (stating, 
"In evaluating the validity of a stop . . . we must consider 'the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.'"). In making its decision, the lower court 
considered all of the circumstances taken as a whole and determined that Officer 
Burton had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. M.R. 48:16; See also Rodriguez-
Lopi, 954 P.2d at 1292 (stating, "a sufficient number of suspicious circumstances, 
taken in their totality, can justify an investigatory stop."). The lower court also properly 
deferred to Officer Burton's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
behavior when he determined that the occupants of the vehicle were hiding on the floor 
of the car in an attempt to avoid detection, rather than merely lying down in a car. M.R. 
48:16; See also Beach, 2002 UT App 160, % 8 (stating, "Utah Courts 'judge the 
officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience . . . and 
accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions."). Additionally, Officer Burton's stop was justified because the conduct he 
witnessed, three people hiding on the floor of a car, was unusual. See Rodriguez-Lopi, 
954 P.2d at 1292 (finding that reasonable suspicion may be based on "'unusual 
conduct that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 'that criminal activity may be 
afoot.'") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Finally, it would have been a dereliction of 
his duty as an officer for Officer Burton to have ignored the circumstances that faced 
13 
him at the time of the stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (finding that it would have been 
poor police work if the officer had not investigated the defendants' suspicious 
behavior). 
Manzanares and Kassuhn cite several cases in support of their argument that 
Officer Burton did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Br. Aplt. 12-20. 
The Appellants cite to cases where there was no attempt to avoid detection by hiding. 
See Br. Aplt. 12-20. Manzanares and Kassuhn first cite State v. Markland, where 
officers responded to a call from dispatch at approximately 3:00 a.m. Br. Aplt. at 10 
(citing 2004 UT App. 1, f 5, 84 P.3d 240, 241. The dispatch reported that someone was 
screaming on the east side of the apartment complex. Markland, 2004 UT App. 1,15. 
Upon arriving, the officers saw the defendant. Id. He was walking down a dark street 
toward a dead end and was carrying a cloth shoulder bag. Id, The officers stopped the 
defendant and questioned him as to where he was going. Id. The officers also 
requested identification and ran a warrants check. Id The defendant was arrested on an 
outstanding warrant and a search was conducted incident to arrest. Id This Court 
found that the totality of the circumstances did not support reasonable suspicion to stop 
the defendant. Id *f 9. This Court stated, "[The Officer] did not observe Defendant 
engaged in illegal activity; he did not articulate any grounds for believing that the 
Defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity; and he did not make a 
connection between Defendant and the reported screaming." Id. Although the Court in 
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Markland did not find that the facts before them provided the officer with reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant, the Court recognized that "case law indicates that 
where an officer observes behavior that is consistent with illegal activity, officer may 
have reasonable suspicion to investigate." Id. at ^ f 9 n3. In this case, unlike Markland, 
the officer did observe behavior consistent with illegal activity. M.R. 48:4, 16. Officer 
Burton was called to investigate suspicious behavior that he observed firsthand when 
he saw Hadden, Manzanares, and Kassuhn hiding on the floor of the car in an attempt 
to avoid detection by hiding. M.R. 48:4, 11, 16. In Markland the defendant was merely 
walking down the street when without any indication that the defendant may be 
involved in criminal activity, the officer stopped him. 
Manzanares and Kassuhn next cite State v. Swanigan, a case similar to Markland, 
where two individuals were stopped because they were seen walking through a 
neighborhood, late at night, where a burglary had recently occurred. 699 P.2d 718, 719 
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme found that because "[t]he officer did not observe the 
men engaged in any unlawful or suspicious activity," there was no reasonable 
suspicion to stop the individuals. Id Again, this case is distinguishable from the case 
presently before the Court. In Swanigan, the officers did not make the connection 
between the burglary and the individuals who were merely walking down the street late 
at night. See id Here, Officer Burton made the connection between the suspicious 
circumstances and the defendants and he observed the suspicious behavior. 
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Additionally, in Swanigan, there was no attempt to evade the officer as there was in 
this case. See id 
The remainder of cases cited by the Appellants are also distinguishable from the 
case before the Court. For example, at least one case supports a finding that a car 
traveling through a neighborhood where it does not belong, late at night, without more, 
cannot support reasonable suspicion. Br. Aplt. at 14 (citing State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 
674, 675 (1986)). However, the foregoing scenario is unlike the situation in this case 
where Officer Burton observed Manzanares, Kassuhn and Hadden acting suspicious by 
attempting to avoid detection by hiding in the vehicle. 
Another scenario supports Manzanares5 and Kassuhn's claim that walking down 
the street late at night is not enough to support reasonable suspicion to stop. Br. Aplt. 
at 14-15 (citing State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Swanigan, 699 
P.2d at 719; Carpena, 716 P.2d 674; State v. Baumgaertel 762 P.2d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). However, the cases supporting the Appellants' argument are distinguishable 
from the situation in this case, where the facts included: a vehicle not belonging to the 
neighborhood; the lateness of the hour; and the defendants attempt to avoid detection 
by hiding on the floor of the vehicle. M.R. 48:16. 
Manzanares and Kassuhn also claim that they were merely lying down in the car 
and that this behavior is consistent with innocent behavior. Br. Aplt. 19. However, as 
stated above, courts defer to the officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
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suspicious behavior. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, | 8 (quoting Williams, 271 F.3d at 
1268). Officer Burton determined, based on his experience and training as an officer, 
that Manzanares', Kassuhn's, and Hadden's behavior was not merely people lying 
down in a car, but rather, people hiding in an attempt to avoid detection by police. 
M.R. 48, 4:5-8, 11:16-17. This behavior is not consistent with innocent behavior. Even 
if this Court finds that there was an ambiguity as to whether or not the occupants of the 
vehicle were hiding, Officer Burton was still justified in resolving the ambiguity. See 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (2000) (finding that when an officer sees ambiguous 
behavior suggests the possibility of criminal behavior, the officer may "detain the 
individual to resolve the ambiguity."). Furthermore, hiding is a form of evasion 
similar to flight. This Court has found that flight is an act of evasion, and although "[i]t 
is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, . . . it is certainly suggestive of such." 
Cushmg, 2004 UT App. 73, ^ 20, 88 P.3d 368 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25). In 
Cushing, this Court also suggested that "'obvious attempts to evade officers can 
support reasonable suspicion."' Id at f 21 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 885(1975)). 
In Conclusion, it would be against public policy for this Court to over-turn the 
lower court's ruling based upon a lack of reasonable suspicion since it would, in effect, 
deter police from investigating suspicious activity where the circumstances, such as 
those present in this case, suggest that criminal activity may be afoot. Thus, based on 
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the foregoing, this Court should uphold the lower court's finding that Officer Burton 
had reasonable suspicion to stop the Appellants. 
B. The Search Of The Defendants Vehicle Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The 
Stop 
The second part of determining if a stop was reasonable requires courts to 
determine whether '"the resulting detention [was] reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, f 29, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32). In this case, the 
detention Manzanares and Kassuhn was related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference. Manzanares, Kassuhn, and Hadden were behaving in a 
suspicious manner by hiding on the floor of the vehicle, and Officer Burton was 
justifiably investigating the circumstances before him to determine whether or not the 
defendants were engaged in criminal activity. In Provo City v. Spotts, the defendant 
was observed smoking what appeared to marijuana. 861 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). The defendant argued that the officer observed innocent behavior that 'was 
consistent with that of a individual smoking a hand-rolled cigarette." Id However, this 
Court disagreed, stating "[I]t does not follow, nor have we held, that the mere fact that 
there might be an innocent explanation for conduct wholly vitiates reasonable 
suspicion. To the contrary, where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably consistent with 
innocent. . . activity,' but is also 'strongly indicative' of criminal activity, we will not 
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hesitate to conclude that reasonable suspicion exists." Id 
In Beach, the officers observed a hand-to-hand exchange between the defendant 
and another person which caused the officers to suspect drug activity. 2002 UT App 
1605 TI 11. The defendant, like Manzanares and Kassuhn in this case, argued that the 
officer exceeded the scope of the detention after the defendant gave an innocent 
explanation for his actions. Id. The defendant claimed that explanation should have 
alleviated the officer's suspicion of drug activity. IdL This Court disagreed, stating, 
"While some of Defendant's activities could be explained as innocent, 'officers need 
not close their eyes to suspicious circumstances.'" Id (quoting Williams, 271 F.3d at 
1270). The Court also explained that the officer "was not bound to accept Defendant's 
first explanation as truthful, particularly when he observed other suspicious actions by 
the defendant. These actions included Defendant's haste to exit the scene when first 
approached and his extreme and continued nervousness, which were at odds with 
Defendant's seemingly innocuous explanation and bore further investigation." Id. 
Similarly, in this case, Officer Burton did not have to accept Manzanares' and 
Kassuhn's explanation that they were in the area looking for a friend's house, 
especially since he saw them hiding on the floor of the vehicle and because they 
disobeyed an order not to move. This behavior is at odds with their innocuous 
explanation. Thus, the suspicious actions of hiding and disobeying an officer warranted 
further investigation. 
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C. The Search Was Permissible Under The Plain View Doctrine 
The mail should not be suppressed because it was in plain view. The Fourth 
Amendment requires that a warrant be obtained before a search commences. State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). However, there are several exceptions to the 
rule that all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. See id. The search in this 
case falls within valid exceptions to the warrant requirement, because the evidence was 
in the officer's plain view. Id; See also Katz v. United State, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983). "[T]o establish that the plain 
view exception applies, the State must demonstrate that: '(1) the officer is lawfully 
present where the search . . . occurs; (2) the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the 
evidence is clearly incriminating.'" State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976-77 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting Romero, 660 P.2d at 718). 
The first part of the plain view analysis requires a determination as to whether 
the officer was "lawfully present." As discussed above, Officer Burton was lawfully 
present because he was investigating suspicious behavior and the possibility of 
criminal activity. After determining if the officer was "lawfully present," the second 
factor analyzed is whether the items were in plain view. In this case, the door of the 
vehicle was already open. M.R. 4. Although Officer Burton received consent to 
search, he could see the mail from where he lawfully stood outside the vehicle before 
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he actually entered the car. M.R. 48:7. Officer Burton could see that the mail had 
several different addresses on it and names that did not match any of the occupants of 
the vehicle. M.R. 48:7. Therefore, the second part of the plain view doctrine is satisfied 
because the mail was in plain view sticking out from the seat and could be seen from 
where Officer Burton stood outside the vehicle. M.R. 48:7. 
Finally, the items in plain view must be incriminating. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has stated that "[e]vidence is 'clearly incriminating' if the officer observing it 
has 'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). From where Officer 
Burton stood outside the vehicle, he could see mail that had names and addresses on it 
that did not belong to any of the occupants of the vehicle. M.R. 48:6-7. He could see 
that the large amount of mail appeared to have been shoved under the seat by someone 
in a hurry to dispose of it. M.R. 48:6-7. 
Because the requirements for the plain view exception to warrantless searches 
was satisfied, Manzanares' and Kassuhn's argument is without merit. Thus, the 
warrantless search of the Appellants' vehicle is justified under the plain view doctrine 
and any evidence seized in the police encounter is admissible. 
D. Even If The Court Decides That The Evidence Is Not Admissible Under 
The Plain View Doctrine, The Evidence Is Still Admissible Because It Was 
Lawfully Obtained Pursuant To Voluntary Consent To Search. 
When the State seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, 
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the State has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily 
given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). The factors provided by 
Utah case law for evaluating the voluntariness of consent demonstrate Hadden's 
consent to the search was valid. Utah courts have outlined factors to assist judges in 
determining whether or not the police officers used coercion or duress to obtain a 
consent search. Factors showing a lack of duress or coercion may include: 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) 
cooperation by the owner; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the 
part of the officer. 
State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
103, 103). 
Also, the analytical framework of whether consent was voluntarily given "is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances including the 
'characteristics of the accused and details of the police conduct.'" State v. Delaney, 
869 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1995)). Additionally, "[i]t is noteworthy that the government is not required to prove 
the defendant knew of his rights to refuse consent in order to prove voluntariness." 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The fact that Hadden was in handcuffs does not vitiate voluntary consent. M.R. 48: 
5. Voluntary consent may be given even if the defendant is handcuffed and in custody. 
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State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Bobo, the defendant 
argued that his consent was not voluntary because he was handcuffed and in custody 
and because the officers repeatedly asked the defendant for consent stating that the 
county attorney was preparing a warrant. Id. This Court disagreed, stating, "Consent 
given while in custody does not, per se, render the consent involuntary. . . . It is but a 
single element for the trial court to consider." IdL at 1273-74 (citations omitted). The 
court cited People v. Ratliff, where the California Supreme Court found that 
"handcuffing does not demonstrate that consent is involuntary." IdL at 1274 (citing 715 
P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1986)). The court in, also cited the Second Circuit, where the court 
found that "coercion does not follow from handcuffing." Id. (citing U.S. v. Kon Yu-
Leung, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990)). 
In this case, the undisputed facts are that Hadden gave consent to search. M.R. 
48: 6. Officer Burton did not attempt to trick or coerce Hadden to consent to the 
search. M.R. 48:6. He simply asked Hadden if he could search the vehicle and she 
complied. M.R. 48:6. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the State requests that the Court 
find that Officer Burton did not exceed the scope of the stop because either the 
evidence seized was in plain view or Officer Burton had consent to search. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the convictions of Manzanares and Kassuhn should be affirmed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
§ 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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Amendment IV - Search and seizure. Ratified December 15, 1791. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 




3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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Date of birth: December 18, 1983 
Audio 
Tape Number: 03-23 0 Tape Count: 2 680 
CHARGES 
3. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty 
4. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 45 day(s) 
Credit is granted for 45 day(s) previously served. 
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Case No: 021400561 
Date: Aug 14, 2003 
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE 
THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT TO HAVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED AND CLOSE 
CASE. 
Dated t h i s >M day of -All C\ / \ o O s * 
JUDITH S ATpERj'ON 
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2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty 
The Information is read. 
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Defendant waives time for sentence. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 45 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 41 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 4 day(s) previously served. 
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The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $150.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 021400560. 
The defendant is to pay $25.00 monthly on the 15th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 22. 
The first payment is due on 09/15/2003 the final payment of $18.59 
is due on 07/15/2005. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s). 
Defendant to serve 4 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 400.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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case. 
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